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Abstract
It is incredibly easy for a system designer to
misspecify the objective for an autonomous
system (“robot”), thus motivating the desire to
have the robot learn the objective from human
behavior instead. Recent work has suggested
that people have an interest in the robot per-
forming well, and will thus behave pedagog-
ically, choosing actions that are informative
to the robot. In turn, robots benefit from in-
terpreting the behavior by accounting for this
pedagogy. In this work, we focus on mis-
specification: we argue that robots might not
know whether people are being pedagogic or
literal and that it is important to ask which
assumption is safer to make. We cast objec-
tive learning into the more general form of a
common-payoff game between the robot and
human, and prove that in any such game lit-
eral interpretation is more robust to misspecifi-
cation. Experiments with human data support
our theoretical results and point to the sensitiv-
ity of the pedagogic assumption.
1 INTRODUCTION
It is notoriously difficult for system designers to directly
specify the correct objective for a system (Krakovna,
2018; Lehman et al., 2018; Clark & Amodei, 2017). This
difficulty has sparked a line of work that instead aims
to infer the correct objective from other forms of hu-
man input, such as demonstrations (Ng & Russell, 2000;
Abbeel & Ng, 2004; Ziebart et al., 2008), comparisons
(Wirth et al., 2017; Sadigh et al., 2017; Christiano et al.,
2017), or corrections (Bajcsy et al., 2017; Jain et al.,
2015).
These methods operate under the assumption that human
behavior is near-optimal with respect to the objective
to be inferred. This assumption makes sense in many
domains, like an autonomous car learning an objective
function for driving through observing human drivers
(Levine & Koltun, 2012). However, recent work shows
that this assumption may not hold in collaborative set-
tings (Ho et al., 2016), in which the human is aware
that the robot needs to learn. In such settings, the per-
son might optimize for teaching the robot about the ob-
jective, which is not the same as directly optimizing the
objective itself (Dragan et al., 2013b; Hadfield-Menell
et al., 2016; Ho et al., 2016). Figure 1 shows an exam-
ple of the difference between the two. When the human
optimizes for the objective, she takes any optimal path to
the goal. When the human optimizes for teaching the ob-
jective, she takes the path that best signals the objective.
We refer to these two types of human behavior as literal
and pedagogic, and note that the robot can interpret hu-
man behavior using either model:
1. The literal human directly optimizes for the objec-
tive.
2. The literal robot infers the objective while assum-
ing the human is literal.
3. The pedagogic human optimizes for teaching the
literal robot the objective.
4. The pedagogic robot (sometimes called “prag-
matic” (Fisac et al., 2018)) infers the objective
while assuming the human is pedagogic.
...
In general, this recursion could go on further, and in the-
ory, it is always better for the human and robot to be at a
deeper level of recursion. The potential for increased per-
formance suggests that we should try to make our robots
more pedagogic. Indeed, this is the direction suggested
and pursued by Fisac et al. (2018); Malik et al. (2018);
Hadfield-Menell et al. (2016)
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Figure 1: In this scenario, the robot infers whether it is ok to walk on the grass or not from a demonstration provided
by the human (it already knows pavement is always ok). (a) The literal and pedagogic human’s demonstrations. When
grass is ok, the literal human is equally likely to walk on the grass or pavement. On the other hand, when grass is ok,
the pedagogic human always walks on the grass in order to signal that grass is ok. (b) The beliefs of the literal robot
LR and pedagogic robot PR after observing a demonstration. LR and PR assume human is literal and pedagogic,
respectively. LR and PR differ in how strong their beliefs are after witnessing the human walk on pavement, leading
to different problems when the human is misspecified. If the human is literal, but the robot is pedagogic, then it makes
too strong of an inference. On the other hand, if the human is pedagogic, but the robot is literal, then it makes too
weak of an inference.
However, the increased performance is contingent on the
human being pedagogic. In practice, it may be difficult to
know whether the human is acting literally or pedagogi-
cally, and furthermore, different humans may behave dif-
ferently. We argue that the robot should be robust to mis-
specification of the human, and thus it is important to
ask which assumption – literal or pedagogic – is safer to
make.
Which is worse—interpreting a pedagogic human liter-
ally (literal robot + pedagogic human) or interpreting a
literal human pedagogically (pedagogic robot + literal
human)? In both cases, the model of the human is incor-
rect, and we might expect that which is better depends
on the context and the task; surprisingly, we are able to
prove that regardless of the task, the literal robot is more
robust, suggesting that it may be safer to simply use a
literal robot. Our contributions are the following:
• Section 2: Theoretical Analysis. We cast objective
learning into the more general form of a common-
payoff game between the human and robot. We then
prove that a pedagogic robot and a literal human al-
ways do worse than a literal robot and a pedagogic
human, showing that misspecification is worse in
one direction than the other.
• Section 3: Empirical Analysis. We test the effects
of misspecification on data from human teaching.
The data confirms that assuming pedagogic behav-
ior when people are literal is worse than assuming
literal behavior when people are pedagogic. Sur-
prisingly, we find that the literal robot does better
than the pedagogic robot even when people are try-
ing to be pedagogic, because of the discrepancy be-
tween the pedagogic model of humans and real hu-
man behavior.
• Section 4: Theoretical vs Empirical. Our empirical
results are surprising, in that, the pedagogic model
is a state of the art cognitive science model that is fit
to the human data and has relatively high predictive
accuracy, yet the pedagogic robot does worse than
the literal robot with humans who are trying to be
pedagogic. We use our theory to derive a hypothe-
sis for why this could be. The hypothesis is that in
practice different humans vary in how literal or ped-
agogic they are, which our theory implies will de-
grade the performance of the pedagogic robot more
than the literal robot. We find positive evidence for
this hypothesis, indicating that robustness to a pop-
ulation of humans is an important consideration in
choosing a pedagogic versus literal robot.
• Section 5: Can we “fix” the pedagogic robot? An
intuitive idea for improving the pedagogic robot is
to give it a model of the pedagogic human that has
higher predictive accuracy. For example, what if
instead of assuming all people are pedagogic, the
robot estimated how pedagogic each person is? Un-
fortunately, we find that this makes no difference.
And in fact, we show that better models can actually
worsen performance due to a subtle, yet remarkable
fact: a human model with higher predictive accu-
racy does not necessarily imply higher inferential
accuracy for the robot.
In conclusion, we found that not only are pedagogic
robots less robust to the human’s recursion level, they
can also perform worse when people are actually being
pedagogic – even with a state of the art pedagogic model
tuned to human data. This points to a surprising brittle-
ness of the pedagogic assumption. Further, we point out
that a more predictive human model will not necessarily
solve the problem because improving the model’s pre-
dictive accuracy does not necessarily lead to better robot
inference.
The difficulty of objective specification was an impor-
tant motivation for pursuing objective learning in the first
place. But in our pursuit of objective learning, we ought
to be careful to not simply trade the problem of objective
specification for the equally, if not more, difficult prob-
lem of human specification. In practice, humans will de-
viate from our models of them, and thus, it is important
to understand which assumptions are robust and which
are not.
Rather than trying to make the robot more pedagogic,
which requires brittle assumptions on the human, an al-
ternative direction may be to help the human become
more pedagogic. How can we make robots that are easier
for humans to teach? Perhaps simpler robots are actu-
ally better, if it means that humans can more easily teach
them.
2 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we cast objective learning into the
more general form of a common-payoff1 game be-
tween the robot and human. We then formalize the
literal/pedagogic robot/human, and prove that in any
common-payoff game a literal robot and pedagogic hu-
man perform better than a pedagogic robot and literal hu-
man.
2.1 GENERALIZING OBJECTIVE LEARNING
TO CI(RL)
Before proceeding to our proof, we give background on
how common-payoff games generalize standard objec-
tive learning. In particular, objective learning can be
modeled as a cooperative inverse reinforcement learning
(CIRL) game (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016), a common-
payoff game in which only the human knows an objec-
tive/reward function r.
Formally, a CIRL game is defined as a tuple
〈S, {AH,AR}, T, {R, r}, P0, γ} where S is the set of
states, AH and AR are the set of actions available to the
human and robot, T (s′ | s, aH, aR) is the transition dis-
tribution specifying the probability of transitioning to a
new state s′ given the previous state s and the actions aH
1A game in which all agents have the same payoff.
and aR of both agents, R is the space of reward func-
tions, r : S × AH ×AR → R is the shared reward func-
tion (known only to H), P0 is the initial distribution over
states and reward functions, and γ is the discount factor.
The joint payoff in a CIRL game is traditionally value,
expected sum of rewards. Since only the human in CIRL
knows the shared reward function, this indirectly incen-
tivizes the human to act in ways that signal the reward
function and incentivizes the robot to learn about the re-
ward function from the human’s behavior2. However, we
can also consider a version that directly incentivizes re-
ward inference by making the payoff the accuracy of the
robot’s inference.
To illustrate how objective learning settings are special
cases of CIRL games, we give an example for the learn-
ing from demonstrations setting.
Example 2.1 (Demonstration-CI(RL)). Learning from
demonstrations can be modeled as a CIRL game with two
phases. In the first phase, the human provides demonstra-
tions. In the second phase...
(a) (CIRL) the robot acts in the environment. The
game’s joint payoff for the robot and human is the
value (expected sum of rewards) attained by the
robot.
(b) (CI) the robot outputs an estimate of the reward
function. The game’s joint payoff for the robot and
human is a measure of the accuracy of the robot’s
inference.
The second formulation (b) is a cooperative inference
(CI) problem (Yang et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2019).
In CI, there is a teacher (e.g human) who is teaching a
learner (e.g. robot) a hypothesis r (e.g the reward) via
data d (e.g. demonstrations). The human has a distri-
bution over demonstrations pH(d | r) and the robot has
a distribution over rewards pR(r | d). Given a starting
distribution of human demonstrations, pH0 (d | r), the op-
timal solution for these two distributions can be found
via fixed-point iteration of the following recursive equa-
tions3:
pRk (r | d) ∝ pHk (d | r) , (1)
pHk+1(d | r) ∝ pRk (r | d) . (2)
2In fact, in Demonstration-CIRL (Example 2.1), the best
that the robot can do is infer a posterior distribution over re-
wards from the human’s demonstrations, and then act optimally
with respect to the posterior mean.
3Wang et al. (2019) show that fixed-point iteration con-
verges for all discrete distributions. For simplicity, we have
written equations (1) and (2) assuming that the human and
robot’s prior over rewards and demonstrations is uniform, but
in general, the equations can incorporate any prior (Yang et al.,
2018).
2.2 PROOF: LITERAL ROBOTS ARE MORE
ROBUST
We now proceed to formalize what we mean by literal
and pedagogic and to prove that the literal robot is more
robust to misspecification of whether the human is lit-
eral or pedagogic. Suppose that the human and robot
are acting in a cooperative game. Let H and R be the
space of policies for the human and robot, respectively.
The joint payoff for the human and robot is denoted by
U : H × R → R. The joint payoff function could be
value, as assumed by CIRL, or accuracy of inference, as
assumed by CI.
To define literal and pedagogic, we define a set of re-
cursive policies for the human and robot. Let H0 be a
starting human policy. For k ≥ 0, define the recursive
policies
Rk = BR(Hk) , (3)
Hk+1 = IR(Rk) . (4)
We assume that at each level of recursion the robot does
a best response BR : H → R. However, for the hu-
man, we only assume that at each step she improves over
her previous policy. This allows for arbitrary irrational-
ities, so long as the next policy is at least as good as
the previous one. We call this an “improving” response
IR : R → H, and define both types of responses below.
Definition 2.1. A best response for the robot is a func-
tion BR : H → R such that for any human policy
H ∈ H and robot policy R ∈ R,
U(H,BR(H)) ≥ U(H,R) .
Definition 2.2. An improving response for the human is
a function IR : R → H such that ∀ k ≥ 0,
U(IR(Rk), Rk) ≥ U(Hk, Rk) .
We give special emphasis to what we call the literal hu-
man and robot, H0 and R0, and the pedagogic human
and robot, H1 and R1.4 We now provide an example of
the literal and pedagogic policies for the Demonstration-
CI setting (Example 2.1b). In this case, the human and
robot policies can be modeled by the recursive CI equa-
tions (1) and (2).
1. The literal human H0 is noisily-optimal with re-
spect to the reward function r. The probability
4There is nothing that requires the literal level to be at re-
cursion level 0 and the pedagogic level to be at recursion level
1. Our proof of Claim 2.1 holds when the literal level is any
k ≥ 0 and the pedagogic level is k + 1.
pH0 (d | r) that she gives a demonstration d is expo-
nentially proportional to the reward of the demon-
stration, denoted by r(d):
pH0 (d | r) ∝ exp(r(d)) .
2. The literal robot R0 does a BR to the literal hu-
man, i.e. does Bayesian inference assuming the hu-
man is literal,
pR0 (r | d) ∝ pH0 (d | r) ,
and then uses the posterior mode as its estimate for
the reward r.
3. The pedagogic human H1 picks demonstrations
that are informative to the literal robot5:
pH1 (d | r) ∝ pR0 (r | d) .
Note this is not a best response, which would
unrealistically require the human to choose
arg maxd p
R
0 (r | d).
4. The pedagogic robot R1 does a BR to the peda-
gogic human, i.e. does Bayesian inference assum-
ing the human is literal,
pR1 (r | d) ∝ pH1 (d | r) ,
and then uses the posterior mode as its estimate for
the reward r.
We show that for any common-payoff game the payoffs
for the literal/pedagogic human/robot pairs have the fol-
lowing ranking:
Pedagogic R1, H1 ≥ Literal R0, Pedagogic H1
≥ Literal R0, H0 ≥ Pedagogic R1, Literal H0 . (5)
In particular, a pedagogic robot R1 and a literal human
H0 always do worse than a literal robot R0 and a ped-
agogic human H1, showing misspecification is worse
one way than the other. The ranking has the following
straight-forward proof.
Claim 2.1. In any common-payoff game, the ranking of
payoffs between a literal/pedagogic human/robot is
U(H1, R1) ≥ U(H1, R0) ≥ U(H0, R0) ≥ U(H0, R1) .
Proof. Since R1 = BR(H1), we have U(H1, R1) ≥
U(H1, R0). Since H1 = IR(R0), we have
U(H1, R0) ≥ U(H0, R0). Since R0 = BR(H0), we
have U(H0, R0) ≥ U(H0, R1).
5Typically, the human is modeled as being exponentially
more informative: pH1 (d | r) ∝ exp(pR0 (r | d)). This is the
form we will use in our experiments.
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Figure 2: (a) The instructions given to participants in the literal and pedagogic condition, and a sample demonstration
from both conditions. In the pedagogic case, participants were more likely to visit multiple safe colors, as well as to
loop over safe tiles multiple times. (b) All possible reward functions. Each tile color can be either safe (0 points) or
dangerous (-2 points). Figure modified from Ho et al. (2018).
3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we test our results in practice using exper-
imental data from actual humans, who provide demon-
strations that the robot uses to infer the objective from.
These experiments are a way of stress-testing our theo-
retical results, which assumed that at each level of re-
cursion, the robot computes a best response and that the
human never does worse than her previous level. In prac-
tice, there will be a difference between what humans ac-
tually do, and the model of the human, which could cause
both the human and robot to break our theoretical as-
sumptions.
3.1 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We test the performance of literal/pedagogic
robot/human pairs on data from Experiment 2 in
(Ho et al., 2016), which was subsequently followed
up on in (Ho et al., 2018). In the experiment, humans
are asked to act in different types of gridworlds. The
gridworld has one goal state that is worth 10 points
and three other types of tiles (orange, purple, cyan).
Each type of tile can each be either “safe” (0 points) or
“dangerous” (-2 points). Thus, there are 23 = 8 possible
reward functions, which are depicted in Figure 2b.
Sixty particpants were recruited from Mechanical Turk.
The participants are told that they will get two cents of
bonus for each point they get. Participants were split
into two conditions, a literal and pedagogic condition,
depicted in Figure 2a. In the literal condition, the partic-
ipant only gets points for their own actions in the grid-
world. In the pedagogic condition, the participant is told
that their demonstration will be shown to another person,
a learner, who will then apply what they learn from the
demonstration to act in a separate gridworld. The partic-
ipant still gets points based on their own actions, but is
also told that the number of points the learner receives
will be added as a bonus.
3.2 HUMAN AND ROBOT MODELS
We model the robot and human following Ho et al.
(2018). We use the same model parameters that Ho et al.
(2018) found to be the best qualitative match to the hu-
man demonstrations.
Notation. Let S be the set of states and A be the set of
actions. The gridworld has a reward function r : S ×
A× S → R. The optimal Q-value function for a reward
function r is denoted by Q∗r : S × A → R. The robot
has a uniform prior belief over the reward function, i.e, it
puts uniform probability on all 23 = 8 reward functions
depicted in Figure 2b. The human and robot models are
as follows.
1. Literal H. At each time step t, the probability
HL(at|st, r) that the literal human takes action at
given state st and the reward r is exponentially pro-
portional to the optimal Q-value,
HL(at | st, r) ∝ exp(Q∗r(st, at)/τL) . (6)
The temperature parameter τL controls how noisy
the human is.
2. Literal R. The robot does Bayesian inference,
while assuming that the human is literal. The
robot’s posterior belief at time t+ 1 is
Rt+1L (r) ∝ HL(at | st, r)
· T (st+1 | st, at) ·RtL(r) . (7)
3. Pedagogic H. The pedagogic human optimizes a re-
ward function r′ that trades-off between optimizing
the reward in the gridworld and teaching the lit-
eral robot the reward. At time step t, the reward
is r′(st, at, st+1) = r(st, at, st+1) + κ(Rt+1L (r) −
RtL(r)). The parameter κ ≥ 0 controls how “peda-
gogic” the human is. The probabilityHP (at | st, r)
that the pedagogic human takes action at given state
st and the reward r is exponentially proportional to
the optimal Q-value associated with the modified
reward r′,
HP (at | st, r) ∝ exp(Q∗r′(st, at)/τP ) . (8)
The temperature parameter τP controls how noisy
the human is.
4. Pedagogic R. The robot does Bayesian inference,
while assuming that the human is literal. The
robot’s posterior belief at time t+ 1 is
Rt+1P (r) ∝ HP (at | st, r)
· T (st+1 | st, at) ·RtP (r) . (9)
3.3 RESULTS
We evaluate each literal/pedagogic robot/human pair on
the accuracy of the robot’s inference, i.e, P(rˆ = r),
where r is the true reward and rˆ is the robot’s guess.
We take the robot’s guess rˆ to be the mode of its be-
lief, as given by the robot models (7) and (9). We test
each pair with both the demonstrations generated by ac-
tual humans and demonstrations generated by simulating
humans according to the human models (6) and (7).
Figure 3 depicts our experimental results6. We refer to
the actual human as AH, the human model as H, and the
robot as R. Consistent with the theory, the performance
of pedagogic R and literal AH is (significantly) worse
than that of literal R and pedagogic AH, validating that
misspecification is worse one way than the other. How-
ever, the overall ranking of robot/human pairs does not
match the theoretical ranking (Equation 5) we expected.
Surprisingly, even when AH is pedagogic, pedagogic R
performs (insignificantly) worse than literal R. The em-
pirical ranking is
Literal R, Pedagogic AH ≥ Pedagogic R, AH
≥ Literal R, AH ≥ Pedagogic R, Literal AH .
The empirical ranking carries a stronger implication than
our theoretical ranking—it implies that regardless of
whether the human is literal or pedagogic, the robot
should be literal.
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Figure 3: The accuracy of the robot’s inferred reward for
different pairs of human/robot pairs under the demon-
strations provided by actual humans.
4 THEORETICAL VS EMPIRICAL
In our empirical analysis, we found a perplexing result:
the literal robot does better than the pedagogic robot even
when people are trying to be pedagogic. How could this
be? Figure 4 shows the accuracy of robot/human pairs
when the human demonstrations are simulated from the
literal H and pedagogic H models described in equations
(6) and (8). In the simulations, we find, as expected, that
pedagogic R and pedagogic H do better than literal R and
pedagogic H. So clearly, the reason pedagogic R does
worse in the human experiments is that pedagogic AH
(actual humans) is not the same as the pedagogic H (the
human model).
But, in what way does pedagogic AH deviate from ped-
agogic H? Why is literal R more robust to the deviation
than pedagogic R? We derive a hypothesis from our the-
ory. In the theoretical ranking (Equation 5), the perfor-
mance of literal R and literal/pedagogic H is sandwiched
between the performance of pedagogic R + pedagogic H
and pedagogic R + literal H. Thus, literal R is more ro-
bust to whether H is literal or pedagogic than pedagogic
R. This suggests an explanation for why literal R does
better, namely, that pedagogic AH is actually sometimes
literal!
Hypothesis 4.1. Pedagogic AH is actually “in between”
6All error bars and confidence bands in the paper depict
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 4: The accuracy of the robot’s inferred reward for
different pairs of human/robot pairs under the demon-
strations provided by humans simulated according to the
human models in Section 3.2.
literalH and pedagogicH. If this is true, then our theory
implies that literal R will be affected less than pedagogic
R, potentially explaining why pedagogic R does worse
with pedagogic AH than literal R.
To test Hypothesis 4.1, we create two models that are
mixtures of the literal and pedagogic model. We then
measure how much better the mixture models are at pre-
dicting pedagogic AH, and how much the literal and ped-
agogic R are affected by demonstrations generated from
the mixture models.
4.1 DEMONSTRATION MIXTURE MODEL
First, we test what we call the “demonstration mixture
model”. It is possible that the humans in the peda-
gogic condition from Ho et al. (2016) followed different
strategies; some may have attempted to be pedagogic,
but others may have simply been literal. If we look at
which model, literal or pedagogic, is a better fit on a per-
individual basis, we find that 89.7% of literal AH are bet-
ter described by literal H, but in comparison, only 70.0%
of pedagogic AH are better described by pedagogic H.
If we simulate pedagogic humans as only following the
model 70.0% of the time, then the accuracy of the peda-
gogic robot drops to 90% (Figure 5a). The literal robot
is hardly impacted.
4.2 ACTION MIXTURE MODEL
We now test a more continuous version of the previous
setting. We now model humans as acting according to a
mixture policyHm between the literalHL and pedagogic
HP policies. In particular, at each time t the probability
the human picks action at from state s in an environment
with reward r is
HM (at | st, r) =
αHP (at | st, r) + (1− α)HL(at | st, r) . (10)
The parameter α is the probability of picking an action
according to the pedagogic model. We plot the likelihood
of the actual pedagogic human demonstrations as a func-
tion of α, (10). The best value of α over the whole popu-
lation was αP = 0.5 (Figure 6a). But surprisingly, even
a mixture with α = 0.01 or α = 0.99 is far better than
either the literal (α = 0) or pedagogic (α = 1) model. In
addition, the best estimates for α on an individual basis
are somewhat bimodal (Figure 6b), indicating that there
is high individual variation.
Figure 5b shows the performamce of the literal and ped-
agogic robot as α varies. At the best population level
αP = 0.5, we find that the pedagogic robot gets 97%
accuracy. However, if we simulate the pedagogic hu-
mans using the values of α estimated at an individual
level, then the pedagogic robot’s accuracy drops to 90%,
highlighting the importance of individual variation. The
literal robot again remains unaffected.
4.3 DISCUSSION
In both the demonstration and action mixture models, we
found that a mixture between pedagogic H and literal H
was a much better fit to AH. In both cases, when peda-
gogic H is simulated according to the more accurate mix-
ture model pedagogic R’s accuracy drops ten percentage
points, but literal R’s accuracy hardly changes. Thus our
results provide positive evidence for Hypothesis 4.1.
However, Hypothesis 4.1 does not explain the full story.
The hypothesis can only account for a ten percentage
drop in accuracy, but even with this drop, pedagogic R
would still be better than literal R. Furthermore, with
a cursory glance at Figure 5, one might be tempted to
consider pedagogic R quite robust, as it remains high-
performing for large ranges of α. However, as usual, the
real problem is the unknown unknowns. Our empirical
results imply that there are other ways that humans devi-
ate from the model and that literal R is more robust than
pedagogic R to these unknown deviations. Rather than
robustness to α, the more compelling reason for choos-
ing to use literal R is robustness to these unknown devi-
ations.
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Figure 5: The performance of the literal and pedagogic robot when demonstrations are simulated according to the
demonstration mixture model (left/a) or the action mixture model (right/b).
5 CAN WE “FIX” THE PEDAGOGIC
ROBOT?
An intuitive idea for improving the performance of the
pedagogic robot R is to give it a model of the pedagogic
human H that is more predictive. Unfortunately, it is not
so simple. For example, in Section 4.2, we showed that a
mixture between the literal and pedagogic human model
was a much better fit to actual pedagogic humans than
either the literal or pedagogic human model. What if we
had pedagogic R use the more accurate mixture model
as its model of the pedagogic human? Unfortunately, as
shown in Figure 5a (purple line), even if pedagogic R
uses a better predictive model, i.e. the action mixture
model, it does not perform any better.
In fact, it is possible for pedagogic R to do worse when
given a more predictive model of the human. The reason
is that a model that is better for predicting behavior (e.g.
human demonstrations) is not necessarily better for in-
ferring underlying, latent variables (e.g. the reward func-
tion), which is what is important for the robot. This may
help explain why pedagogic R does worse than literal R
with pedagogic AH, even though the pedagogic H model
assumed by pedagogic R is more predictive of pedagogic
AH than the literal H model assumed by literal R.
To illustrate, suppose there is a latent variable θ ∈ Θ
with prior distribution p(θ) and observed data x ∈ X
generated by some distribution p(x | θ). In our setting, θ
corresponds to the objective and x corresponds to the hu-
man input. For simplicity, we assume Θ and X are finite.
We have access to a training dataset D = {(θi, xi)}ni=1
of size n. A predictive model m(x | θ) models the con-
ditional probability of the data x given latent variable θ
for all x ∈ X , θ ∈ Θ. In our case, the predictive model
is the model of the human. The predictive likelihood LX
of a predictive model m is simply the likelihood of the
data under the model:
LX (m) =
n∏
i=1
m(xi | θi) . (11)
The inferential likelihood is the likelihood of the latent
variables after applying Bayes’ rule:
LΘ(m) =
n∏
i=1
m(xi | θi)p(θi)∑
θm(xi | θ)p(θ)
. (12)
Next, we show higher predictive likelihood does not nec-
essarily imply higher inferential likelihood.
Claim 5.1 (Predictive vs inferential likelihood). There
exist settings in which there are two predictive models
m1,m2 such that LX (m1) > LX (m2), but LΘ(m1) <
LΘ(m2).
Proof. Suppose that Θ = {θ1, θ2} and X =
{x1, x2, x3}, the prior p(θ) is uniform over Θ, and the
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Figure 6: (left/a) In blue is the mean negative log-likelihood of the pedagogic human demonstrations under the action
mixture model with probability α. All individuals are assumed to have the same value of α. Note that a mixture
between the literal and pedagogic model is far better than either the literal model (α = 0) or the pedagogic model
(α = 1). In purple is the accuracy of the robot’s inferred reward, when given demonstrations from pedagogic AH, if
it assumes the human acts according to the action mixture model. (right/b) The mixture probability α that maximized
log-likelihood for each individual pedagogic AH.
dataset D contains the following n = 9 items:
D = {(θ1, x1), (θ1, x1), (θ1, x2), (θ2, x2), (θ2, x2),
(θ2, x3), (θ2, x3), (θ2, x3), (θ2, x3)} .
Define the models m1(x | θ) and m2(x | θ) by the fol-
lowing conditional probabilities tables.
m1(x | θ)
x1 x2 x3
θ1 2/3 1/3 0
θ2 0 1/3 2/3
m2(x | θ)
x1 x2 x3
θ1 2/3 1/3 0
θ2 0 2/3 1/3
The model m1 has predictive likelihood LX (m1) =
(2/3)6(1/3)3 and inferential likelihood LΘ(m1) =
(1/2)3. The model m2 has predictive likelihood
LX (m2) = (2/3)4(1/3)5 and inferential likelihood
LΘ(m2) = (1/3)(2/3)3. Thus, LX (m1) > LX (m2),
but LΘ(m1) < LΘ(m2).
In our context, Claim 5.1 means that a human model that
is better in terms of prediction may actually be worse for
the robot to use for inference. An alternative approach
could be to directly fit models that optimize for inferen-
tial likelihood. Unfortunately, this optimization becomes
much trickier because of the normalization over the la-
tent variable space Θ in the denominator of (12), see e.g.
(Dragan et al., 2013a).
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